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Abstract: According to artefactual theories of fiction, fictional characters are
contingently existing abstract entities. One comparative advantage of arte-
factualism over its rivals is its conformity with our pre-theoretic views about
the createdness of these entities. Artefactualism has also its own limitations:
there are specific contexts in which it is apparently wrong to think that charac-
ters are created abstracta. In this paper it is argued that these limitations can
be circumvented if the ontological status of characters is explained in represen-
tational terms.
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Artefactual theories of fictional characters
One distinctive feature of the Artefactual Theory of Fiction is that it adopts a
realist position with respect to the ontological status of fictional characters.
From a realist point of view, paradigmatic literary characters are inhabitants of
the actual world. Protagonists of literary works like Sherlock Holmes and Anna
Karenina are taken to belong to the same fundamental ontological category as
ordinary physical things like stones or lemon trees: they all are existing entities.
Different brands of realism have provided quite different explanations for this
categorial sameness. Some theorists conceived fictional characters as existing
possibila, others maintained that Holmes and Karenina are person-kinds that
exist in the same way as platonic eternal idealities, and they have been occa-
sionally identified also with abstract set-correlates of properties.
Though these explanatory attempts have lead to many interesting theoreti-
cal insights, neither of them seems to correspond entirely to our folk ontological
presumptions. Many of us would say, intuitively, that there is a certain point in
time when fictional characters are brought into being by the creative acts of
their authors, and there may come a time when they simply cease to exist, per-
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haps, when the literary works in which they appear are physically destroyed
and no one remembers them any more. We tend to suppose, again intuitively,
that Sherlock Holmes exists simply because in writing his novel A Study in Scar-
let Arthur Conan Doyle decided to create him, and Anna Karenina exists be-
cause Leo Tolstoy invented her character when he started to write his famous
story.
Thomasson (1999), Voltolini (2006), Goodman (2010) and other adherents of
the Artefactual Theory are of the opinion that our best scientific picture of fic-
tionality has to accommodate this folk ontological view. Given that the created-
ness intuition fits smoothly into the realist ontological framework, this task can
easily be carried out. The result is a view according to which fictional characters
are contingently existing artefactual entities. Two further theses are implicit in
this conception. First, to say that fictional characters are artefacts is equivalent
to saying that they are ontologically dependent entities.1 Sherlock Holmes, for
example, depends for its existence on concrete processes and things: on the
one hand, he (or it) is dependent on the mental acts Conan Doyle performed in
his creative writing process; on the other hand, he (or it) is dependent on the
existence of the physical copies of Conan Doyle’s works. Second, if fictional
characters are indeed artefacts, then the question arises of what kind of arte-
facts they are. The answer is fairly straightforward: because one cannot percep-
tually be in contact with them, and there is no concrete spatiotemporal region
of our actual world where one could find them, characters of literary works
must be abstract entities.2
The Artefactual Theory holds, then, that Sherlock Holmes, Anna Karenina
and their likes are created, dependent abstracta, and as such they are part of
the overall domain of what there is. If we restrict our attention to the ontologi-
cal side of the problem of literary fiction, the Artefactual Theory may seem to
many to be the most natural choice. It gives a consistent and positive answer
concerning the existence question of fictional characters, and perhaps more im-
portantly, it is in accordance with our pretheoretic intuitions about the created,
non-concrete nature of these entities.3

1 For a detailed analysis of the ontological dependence relations between fictional entities and
other existent things, see Thomasson (1999). Fontaine and Rahman (2014) have recently provi-
ded a semantic account of these relations.
2 A Lewisian might object that spatially and temporally inaccessible entities are not necessari-
ly abstract. Possible worlds construed as causally isolated concrete universes are clear counte-
rexamples. But if we limit our art-ontological inquiry to the domain of the actual world, as in
this study, the objection seems pointless.
3 It should be added that a Platonic realist can interpret literary characters as preexistent ab-
stractions. On such a view, to create a character does not mean to bring it literally into existen-
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But the most natural choice may be far from the best choice. The general
plausibility of the artefactualist approach depends, as in other similar cases, on
the relevant details of the theory. In the present context, it is of central impor-
tance for the artefactualist to identify exactly the kind of the abstract entity she
talks about.4
Thomasson (1999, 2006) remarks, in this regard, that the traditional con-
crete/abstract ontological distinction works badly in the fictional realm. In the
Western tradition, abstracta have been continuously thought of as eternal, ne-
cessary and causally inert entities. It follows that things with a temporal origin
cannot be properly classified as abstract. Similarly, the contingent existence of
a thing is typically thought to be the clearest sign of its non-abstractness. It is
quite obvious, however, that fictional characters are not concrete entities. But,
according to traditional classificatory criteria, they are not abstract either. So
Thomasson is right in complaining that the usual concrete/abstract conceptual
scheme is inappropriate for the purposes of a fictional ontology. After all, there
is no a priori reason why these two exclusive categories cannot share certain
conceptual elements. Artefactualists with a revisionist bent can freely introduce
a transitional third category between concreta and abstracta. Those who have
more affinity for the conceptual dualism of the ontological tradition may in-
stead define a subcategory of abstracta that includes non-concrete but created
entities. Notice, though, that both reworking strategies presuppose that the
property of being a created, dependent entity is the same as the property of
being a specific kind of abstracta. This is a non-trivial presupposition as there is
no general consensus among artefactualists on the correct definition of the de-
pendence base of fictional characters. Hence, it is not entirely clear what kind
of abstracta fictional characters are supposed to be.
A number of attempts have been made to clarify the issue. Thomasson’s
(1999) preferred view seems to be that fictional characters belong to a class of
entities that may be called comprehensively socio-cultural constructs. National
institutions, laws and marriages are among the clearest examples of these con-
structs. A common feature of the members of this class is that they have quite
minimal existence conditions (i. e. dependence bases). For example, to bring
into existence a fictional character, it is enough if the following two conditions

ce. It means rather to make certain stipulations that serve to describe it. For detailed argu-
ments, see Deutsch (1991).
4 Abstracta are often subdivided into two classes: that of abstract particulars and abstract uni-
versals. In using the expression ʻthe kind of the abstract entity’, I don’t want to refer to this
subdivision. Rather, I will allude to the observation that differently created abstracta may have
different dependence bases. For more about this, see the remainder of this section.
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are satisfied: (i) the author of a fictional work F must perform a creative inten-
tional act that is directed toward a previously non-existent object, and (ii) the
sentence corresponding to the creative act of the author must be included in the
set of sentences composing F.5 Thomasson is persuaded that fictional characters
and other socio-cultural constructs “can be brought into existence merely by
being represented as existing”.6 One should not misinterpret this by thinking
that Sherlock Holmes is a mere representation. Rather, Thomasson’s view is that
the abstract entity Holmes is dependent ontologically on a certain set of mental
and linguisitc representations.
A related account is adopted by Manning (2014). Manning is not explicitly
committed to the Artefactual Theory, but like Thomasson and other artefactual-
ists, he regards fictional characters as created entities. Literary works, he
claims, represent their natives because our cultural conventions bestow them
with this representational property. Conventions of this sort are operative on
two levels at once: they generate conditions for creating fictional entities and
determine the features that are needed for literary works to represent their na-
tives. This may be taken as a promising explanation of why one can conceive
Sherlock Holmes at the same time as a fictional character and a detective. Man-
ning’s account is rather sketchy, but his basic idea seems to be that, first, the
existence of abstract fictional entities is dependent on a set of conventions that
are operative in a given cultural environment. Second, the set of conventions in
question may be held to be responsible for the fact that fictional entities have
real representations in literary works.
A more complicated account is put forward by Voltolini (2006), who gives
an in-depth analysis of the compatibility between the Artefactual Theory and its
pretense-theoretic and Neo-Meinongian rivals. Fictional characters, argues Vol-
tolini, have a twofold ontological dependence structure. One part of this struc-
ture is the particular de dicto make-believe process-type that is mobilized or in-
stantiated in the activity of authorial creation. The other part consists of certain
properties internally predicated of the fictional character in that very activity.
For instance, in writing his novel, Arthur Conan Doyle pretended in his indivi-
dual way that there is a person denoted by the proper name ʻSherlock Holmes’
and simultaneously predicated a number of properties – such as being talented,
living at 221B Baker Street, being a pipe-smoker, etc. – about this pretended per-
son. The result of this ontologically creative authorial activity is an abstract en-

5 If a fictional character has been successfully created, it has also a generic persistence condi-
tion for its existence. Characters can persist only if there exists at least one copy of the work
that mentions them.
6 Thomasson (1999, 13).
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tity, Holmes, constituted by an instantiated make-believe process-type and a set
of properties. For Voltolini, the final concequence to be drawn from this line of
thought is that fictional characters are a kind of compound abstractum.
I do not want to suggest that there is a common conceptual or theoretical
deficiency in the above-mentioned accounts and thus one or more of them are
seriously flawed. Instead, I will merely try to argue in the remainder of this pa-
per for a hitherto overlooked alternative – an alternative to which one may ad-
here on the grounds of its simplicity and explanatory power.
Representationalism: an overlooked alternative
Presumably, all adherents of the Artefactual Theory will agree that the process
of authorial creation consists of two essential components: the mental act of
inventing a new literary character and the corresponding sentence token that
expresses the content of the mental act in a physical format. These two compo-
nents are arguably indispensable for creating a fictional character, though other
subsidiary factors may also simultaneously be involved. Opinions begin to di-
verge, however, when one asks what kind of abstract entity is the final output
of the process of creation. As we have seen, possible candidates include socio-
cultural abstracta, conventionally bestowed properties and compound abstract
entities.
A further candidate comes to mind, if it is recognized that the linguistic
component has a certain methodological priority in studying the process of
authorial creation. Proper names of literary characters have their primary em-
pirically accessible occurrences in authorial manuscripts. Many of them occur
later in the same orthographic form in published literary texts. The methodolo-
gical emphasis is on the term ʻoccurrence’. The term serves here as a warning
that there is only just one way to fix our thoughts about literary characters,
namely, the way of reading manuscripts or published texts into which their
proper names have been introduced.7 This means that all of our various
thoughts and beliefs about characters can be traced back, ultimately, to our
reading experiences with these texts.
If the above observation is on the right track, and there are no possible
text-independent sources of our knowledge of literary characters, then it is advi-

7 Of course, not all literary characters have proper names. Many of them are introduced and
individuated only by descriptive phrases. I put aside such cases for now because their proper
treatment would lead to unnecessary complications.
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sable to focus our attention on the linguistic component of the process of
authorial creation.
Let us begin with the sentence token that contains the first occurrence of
Arthur Conan Doyle’s famous literary character:
(1) Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe.8
As a written token, (1) is a composite concrete entity: it is a series of ink marks
on a particular sheet of paper. It is more than obvious, however, that Conan
Doyle was not specifically interested in creating such a concrete artefact. His
purpose was instead to bring into existence a well-formed sequence of English
words, that is, a linguistic entity endowed with syntactic and semantic proper-
ties. The concreteness of the ink marks on the paper is therefore a necessary but
unimportant feature of (1).
In contrast, the syntactic order of the component words is an important fea-
ture of (1) because it reveals, among other things, that ʻSherlock Holmes’ func-
tions as the external argument of the verb ʻsmokes’. It is also made manifest by
the syntactic structure of (1) that ʻSherlock Holmes’ fulfills this function as a
proper name. Moreover, as we well know from literary history, it is a proper
name that has never been used before (1) was tokened.
The semantic consequences arising from this situation may seem a bit per-
plexing. If ʻSherlock Holmes’ is a newly created proper name, then how could
its semantic profile be portrayed? Artefactualists had better reject the assump-
tion that ʻSherlock Holmes’ denotes a previously nonexistent literary character,
as they identify characters with abstract entities and this would lead inevitably
to a category mistake. It would be preposterous to say that Conan Doyle’s sen-
tence token expresses a statement about an abstract entity since abstract enti-
ties do not have the habit of smoking pipes.9
The other possible hypothesis is that ʻSherlock Holmes’ behaves in (1) as a
non-denoting proper name. Artefactualists might try to argue that Conan Doyle
has written down (1) in a non-assertive style. Perhaps he has merely pretended
to assert that a certain person smokes a pipe.10 And in the scope of Doyle’s
authorial pretense, the argument might continue, ʻSherlock Holmes’ functions
as a non-denoting expression. But this cannot be the final word on the matter.

8 The first sentential occurrence of ʻSherlock Holmes’ in Doyle’s oeuvre is to be find in his A
Study in Scarlet, page 5: “You don’t know Sherlock Holmes yet”. For the sake of the argumenta-
tion, I have modified this historical datum.
9 This potential problem is discussed at length in Sainsbury (2010).
10 As we have seen, Voltolini (2006) adopts an artefactualist approach which is based, in part,
on pretense-theoretic terms. For another pretense-friendly view, see Thomasson (2003).
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In speaking about Sherlock Holmes, artefactualists, like everyone else, partici-
pate in a venerable proper-name-using practice that has its historical origin in
the circumstances under which (1) was tokened. Using the name as if it were a
genuine denoting expression means a radical divergence from this practice. Ar-
tefactualists do exactly that when they make such statements as ʻSherlock
Holmes has been created by Doyle’ and ʻSherlock Holmes is an abstract arte-
fact’. But then some further explanation is needed of what enables the denoting
use of literary proper names. And even if such an explanation were available to
the artefactualist, that won’t bring us much closer to the understanding of the
semantic profile of (1).
What really requires an explanation is the ability of a sentence token like
(1) to serve as a means for creating an abstract entity. The problem such an
explanation faces is that ʻSherlock Holmes’ operates in our example as a proper
name, and proper names are thought to be best modeled by using a denota-
tional semantics. The semantics of denotation allows only committing interpre-
tations of proper names: ʻSherlock Holmes’ either denotes something or else it
denotes nothing. We have already seen, however, that the first option poses an
interpretive difficulty for the artefactualist: if the name denotes an abstractum,
then the sentence is nonsensical because abstracta are not pipe-smokers. The
second option is also unattractive: if the name denotes nothing, then it remains
unclear how we–readers of Doyle’s novel–can use it to make meaningful state-
ments about the character.
The alternative approach I want to propose here is to think of the semantics
of (1) as free from ontological commitment. On my view, a suitable reading of
(1) is not compelled to try to associate ʻSherlock Holmes’ with a text-indepen-
dent entity (or the absence of thereof). To be fully interpretable, a fictional prop-
er name need not be related to any real existing entity, concrete or abstract, that
might qualify as its semantic value. Interpretability requires only that there be
an elementary semantic function for such names – a function that is presum-
ably shared by all proper names, fictional and nonfictional alike. This is the
function of non-relational representation. The term itself is not an ad hoc inven-
tion. In recent years, various attempts have been made in the relevant literature
to develop a non-relational interpretation of representation. For example, Burge
(2010) points out that representation can transpire even in cases where there is
nothing that could be represented. In Burge’s jargon, representing is always re-
presenting-as-of. A predicate or a proper name X has this underlying structure
independently of whether there is a candidate for being a representatum of X.
Sainsbury (2012) is of a similar opinion when he says that from the claim that ʻX
represents Y’ it does not follow that there is something, Y, that X represents.
Fiction and Representation  7
Brought to you by | Freie Universität Berlin
Authenticated
Download Date | 7/6/15 1:58 PM
In this sense of the term, representing Holmes is not equivalent with expres-
sing a singular proposition containing Holmes as a constituent. A sentence to-
ken can represent Holmes as a smoker even if there is no such person as
Holmes.11 It can be said then that Conan Doyle’s sentence token represents
Sherlock Holmes as being a certain way. More concretely, it represents him (or
it) as smoking a pipe. And it does so wholly independently of the ontological
status of Sherlock Holmes.
Admittedly, saying that ʻSherlock Holmes’ represents Sherlock Holmes non-
relationally sounds a bit misleading because it may give rise to the deceiving
appearance of an actually existing, text-independent entity. And this would
suggest that fictional proper names do involve ontological commitment, con-
trary to what we have said previously about the function of non-relational re-
presentation. To circumvent this difficulty, it would be more convenient to say
that ʻSherlock Holmes’, as it occurs in (1), delivers a simple non-relational
Holmes-representation. And it may be said that the sentence token (1), as a
whole, delivers a complex or structured Holmes-representation. The advantage
of this terminological move is that it helps to avoid unwanted ontological impli-
cations.
Two aspects of this account of representation should be mentioned with
respect to the alternative I set forth. First, given that ʻSherlock Holmes’ is a syn-
tactically founded proper name, the simple Holmes-representation depends con-
stitutively on the syntax of (1). The syntactic structure of (1), in turn, has a ne-
cessary physical dependence base. ʻSherlock Holmes’ would not exist as a
syntactic proper name without the presence of the concrete ink marks on the
paper. Second, the semantic significance of (1) is determined by the elementary
function of non-relational representation. Doyle’s sentence token delivers a
complex Holmes-representation, a meaningful semantic unit, without raising
the need for relating the parts of that representation to entities and properties
that exist outside of it.
Seen from the point of view of the Artefactual Theory, this is a remarkable
result. I have tried to point out that the first publicly accessible occurrence of
the literary character Sherlock Holmes has a physical dependence base where
the adjectival qualifier ʻphysical’ should be taken in the most mundane sense.

11 Consider a non-fictional variant of (1): ʻGünther Grass smokes a pipe’. It is by no means
uncommon to think that at the elementary semantic level, where ʻGünther Grass’ is determined
to be a meaningful (token) proper name, representation functions non-relationally. ʻGünther
Grass’ can be conceived as a denoting name only if the particular facts surrounding its histori-
cal introduction have already been taken into consideration. For a related idea, see Barker
(2004).
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In fact, the role of physical constraints on character creation have been empha-
sized several times in the literature from Thomasson (1999) onwards. Perhaps
this is sufficient to explain why literary characters ought to be understood as
artefacts, but not to explain what kind of artefacts they are.
On my view, the latter question can only be answered by providing a se-
mantic account of the primary textual occurrences of literary characters. The
first step in this direction is to realize, as above, that writing down (or uttering)
a sentence containing the proper name of a previously non-existent person (or
place) is to create a publicly accessible character. And to create a publicly ac-
cessible character, in this sense, is the same as to create a publicly accessible
self-standing representation.
Note that we are still within the standard boundaries of the artefactualist
framework: Sherlock Holmes, Anna Karenina and their likes are treated as cre-
ated, dependent abstracta. But it seems that at this point there is nothing that
would force us to go beyond the immediately available data sources.12 We may
identify the final output of the process of authorial creation in accordance with
the above-mentioned methodological priority of empirical accessibility. That is,
if literary characters are indeed to be identified with a certain kind of created
abstracta, then the most direct and the most plausible view is that they are
brought into existence as instances of publicly accessible representations. And
given the non-relational and self-standing nature of these representations, they
may ultimately be categorized as purely semantic entities.
As we have seen above, Thomasson, Voltolini, and others who sympathize
with the Artefactual Theory, are in agreement concerning the ontological status
of fictional objects. It is also commonly accepted that the existence conditions
of characters include certain sentence tokens produced by the authors of lit-
erary texts. But the representational properties of these sentence tokens are not
supposed to play a constitutive role in the ontological part of the theory. This
has a peculiar consequence. Characters become accessible to us because we
can grasp and understand the meaning of certain authorial words and sen-
tences. What we understand through reading are, of course, abstract representa-
tions. Why not stop here? It is far from being self-evident why other kinds of
abstracta such as socio-cultural constructs or compound abstracta should be in-
troduced into the artefactualist’s ontology. Those who identify characters with

12 According to an influential view within theoretical linguistics, data are statements that sup-
ply plausibility values to theories. Initial plausibility values depend, in turn, on the weighing
of the reliability of the data sources. Presumably, this type of framework could also be fruitfully
applied to the exploration of fictional representations. For a systematic overview of this theme,
see Kertész and Rákosi (2012).
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such putatively extra objects owe us an explanation of why it is sensible to ne-
glect the level of linguistic representations. Unfortunately, so far neither Voltoli-
ni nor Thomasson have attempted to explain the theoretical motives behind
their stance. I think the present proposal is in a better position in this regard, as
the epistemic role linguistic representations play in our literary practices is rela-
tively well understood.
A possible objection at this juncture comes from the perspective of inten-
tionality. If literary characters are nothing more than mere representations, and
intentional acts are necessarily directed at something, then Conan Doyle’s in-
tentional act of inventing Sherlock Holmes must have been directed at an ab-
stract entity. But it is very unlikely that Doyle has mentally represented Holmes
as a mere abstractum before (1) has been written down. The reason for this is
that a mental Holmes-representation would certainly be not semantic in nature.
Holmes would be a geniune semantic representation only if Doyle’s intentional
act were directed at the semantic content of the mental analogue of (1). For this
to be the case, however, the mental analogue of (1) must have been already
brought about by a separate creative act. And this seems to undermine the
claim that Sherlock Holmes was originally created as a purely semantic entity.
In response to this objection, one might point out that it is not mandatory
to accept the view according to which object-directedness is an intrinsic feature
of every intentional state. An adverbial theorist would maintain, for instance,
that in cases of creative thinking, intentional acts do not have to be related to
any (concrete or abstract) entity.13 Instead of being directed toward something,
the distinguishing feature of ontologically productive acts is that they are per-
formed in an adverbial manner. Thus Doyle’s mental activity may be recon-
structed as thinking in a Sherlock-Holmes-wise manner or, more exactly, as
thinking in a Sherlock-Holmes-smokes-a-pipe-wise manner. Adopting an idea
from Kriegel (2008), we may also conjecture that to perform an act in this man-
ner is to be in a mental state that has a “Holmesque” functional or initiative
role. The point of this response is, then, that Doyle’s intentional state counts as
the mental birth place of Sherlock Holmes not because it is directed in some
way toward an entity, but because it a can be used to initiate a non-relational
Holmes-representation in a public language. The act of writing down (1) might
be seen, therefore, as one of the possible physical realizations of the “Holm-
esque” role.

13 See, among others, Rapaport (1979), Gorman (2006) and Kriegel (2008, 2011).
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Resolving the conflict between mutually
exclusive perspectives
The Artefactual Theory is often criticized for being unable to provide an unified
account of literary discourse.14 Consider a classroom context where the follow-
ing sentence is tokened:
(2) Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan Doyle.
In contrast to (1), which is a proper part of the fictional text, (2) involves an
extra-fictional perspective of talking. As noted earlier, artefactualists should re-
ject the view according to which ʻSherlock Holmes’ denotes an abstract entity in
(1). This is not so in the case of (2): (2) informs us about the creation of a literary
character and because literary characters are taken by artefactualists to be ab-
stract entities, ʻSherlock Holmes’ should denote here an abstractum.
The denotational differences between intra-fictional and extra-fictional uses
of ʻSherlock Holmes’ may be explained in a variety of ways. Perhaps (1) and (2)
attribute different kinds of property to the abstract entity Holmes (Parsons,
1980); or maybe the same kind of property is attributed to Holmes in both cases
but (1) and (2) differ in their mode of predication (Voltolini, 2006). Thomasson
(2010) would alternatively argue that (1) established a name-using tradition into
which ʻSherlock Holmes’ had been introduced as a proper name of a person.
Those speakers who engage in this tradition use the name in this sense. But by
knowing that there is no such person as Holmes, they only pretend to make
genuine assertions about “him”.15 Later, when other speakers begin to refer
back to these pretenseful assertions a new tradition emerges in which the name
is used to denote a literary character rather than a person. (2) belongs to this
reflectively grounded tradition, and that is a sufficient explanation of why its
constituent name denotes an abstract entity.16
The main thrust of the opponents’ criticism is that all of these explanatory
strategies postulate an artificial ambiguity in the semantics (or pragmatics) of

14 For recent criticism of this kind, see Sainsbury (2010) and Everett (2013).
15 Thomasson (2010) seems to be inclined to say that speakers in such cases engage in a de
dicto pretense.
16 Note that Thomasson offered earlier a Lewisian solution to bridge the extra-fictional/intra-
fictional semantic gap. On that view, extra-fictional sentences ought to be taken at face value,
and intra-fictional sentences are to be understood as if they were embedded under the implicit
intensional operator ʻaccording to the (relevant) fiction F’. For details, cf. Thomasson (1999).
But note also that Sainsbury has recently provided powerful arguments against all versions of
the operator view. See Sainsbury (2014).
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literary names. If artefactualists are right, then the syntactic proper name ʻSher-
lock Holmes’ must be disambiguated in every particular case of use before any-
thing interesting could be said with it. It is questionable, however, whether our
discursive practices exert such a disambiguating pressure on us. Probably, very
few speakers would be willing to admit that the following sentences are sepa-
rated by a perspective change:
(3) Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan Doyle. And don’t forget that Sher-
lock Holmes used to smoke a pipe.
We may grant that the phenomenon lying behind (3) is general enough to be
considered as a piece of evidence against the validity of the artefactualist’s in-
tra-fictional/extra-fictional distinction. This is not necessarily a fatal problem
for the Artefactual Theory, though. The key point is, I must stress again, that we
have to find the most simple and most plausible candidate for answering the
question concerning the ontological nature of characters.
An advantage of identifying characters with non-relational representations
is that it allows us to give an account for the smooth transition between the first
and the second sentence in (3) without forcing us to reject the basic assump-
tions of the Artefactual Theory. In saying that Conan Doyle was the creator of
Sherlock Holmes, we may be taken to convey the information that the first pub-
licly accessible Holmes-representation was created by Conan Doyle. And in re-
minding others of the smoking habits of Holmes, we may be seen as calling
attention to a set of sentences which represent Holmes as being a certain way,
namely, as being a pipe-smoker. It is difficult to find here any clear indication
for a perspective change. Nor is there any sign of pretense. The common feature
connecting the content of these sentences is rather that both are designed to
deliver us a particular Holmes-representation.
A serious semantic analysis of (3) would require much more than provid-
ing an informal paraphrase like the one given above, but the overall shape of
the argument is hopefully clear: if we accept the view according to which
characters are semantic entities (i. e. non-relational representations) and hold
that all the content of our statements about these semantic entities can be
traced back to the literary texts where they originated, then a sharp terminolo-
gical distinction between intra-fictional and extra-fictional discourses will be-
come superfluous.
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In closing
Though I am fairly well convinced that adopting the present version of the Arte-
factual Theory may lead to a simpler and more uniform treatment of fictional
discourse, some important details may be lacking. Certainly, the most pressing
question that would have to be asked concerns the problem of negative existen-
tials. Can the present theory provide an account for the meaning of sentences
like ʻSherlock Holmes does not exist’? I am inclined to answer this question with
a hesitating yes. The reason for my hesitance is that it would be clearly insuffi-
cient merely to claim that ʻSherlock Holmes’ stands for a Holmes-representation
in a nonexistence statement as we do not want to deny the existence of such
representations. To succeed, an additional move is needed.
Predicating the nonexistence of Holmes, I think, would lose its paradoxical
flavor if we interpreted it as a covert metalinguistic speech act.17 By this interpreta-
tion, to say that Holmes does not exist is equivalent (or nearly equivalent) to deny-
ing that the proper name ʻSherlock Holmes’ is capable of denoting a text-indepen-
dent entity. And this, in turn, is equivalent (or nearly equivalent) to denying the
existence of relational Holmes-representations. If we are aware that the name
ʻSherlock Holmes’was originally tokened in a context of a literary work and know
that our current discursive practices about Holmes can be traced back to that con-
text, we may deny the possibility of such representations.18
The cogency of this type of reasoning depends on whether negative existen-
tials are used standardly to convey metalinguistic information. Perhaps existen-
tial contexts always induce a certain kind of metalinguistic ascent, regardless of
the semantic status of the names being involved. If this is so, the sentence
ʻBanksy exists’ may be interpreted as conveying information both about the pu-
tative bearer of the name and about the name itself. On the one hand, in utter-
ing the sentence, we assert that the bearer of the name ʻBanksy’ is included in
the overall inventory of what there is; on the other hand, we assert that the
name is capable of denoting a text-independent entity. One possible explana-

17 As is perhaps well-known, Kripke (2013) offered a variety of arguments against the metalin-
guistic interpretation of negative existentials. The basic target of his critique was what might
be called the simple metalinguistic approach. According to this, the sentence ʻN does not exist’
means nothing more than that ʻN’ has no referent. I think Kripke is right in rejecting the simple
approach, but, as I try to suggest below, there is an improved variant of the metalinguistic
interpretation that is immune to his criticism.
18 Of course, you might decide to use ʻSherlock Holmes’ to denote a text-independent entity,
for example your dog. But in this case you would establish a new name-using practice for an
extant name that, because of its non-fictional characteristics, would require a separate treat-
ment.
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tion for the presence of the latter information may be that in to apply the pre-
dicate ʻexist’ to an entity, one must be in a position to know something about
the origin of the name of that entity. The clarification of the source and scope of
this epistemic liability, however, awaits further analysis.
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